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Thesis Info
- LABS ID
- 00631
- Thesis Title
- CATCH | BOUNCE: Towards a relational ontology of the digital in art practice
- Author
- James Charlton
- E-mail
- james.charlton AT aut.ac.nz
- 2nd Author
- 3rd Author
- Degree
- Doctor of Philosophy
- Year
- 2017
- Number of Pages
- 352
- University
- Plymouth University
- Thesis Supervisor
- Dr Geoff Cox
- Supervisor e-mail
- geoffrey.cox AT plymouth.ac.uk
- Other Supervisor(s)
- Dr Deborah Robinson, Dr Michael Bowdidge
- Language(s) of Thesis
- English
- Department / Discipline
- Visual Art
- Copyright Ownership
- James Charlton
- Languages Familiar to Author
- English
- URL where full thesis can be found
- TBC
- Keywords
- Digital, art, practice, ontology, Heidegger, Nelson Goodman, Jack Burnham, speculative realism, new materialism.
- Abstract: 200-500 words
- How might ‘the digital’ might be conceived of in an ‘expanded field’ of
art practice, where ontology is flattened such that it is not defined by a
particular media? This text, together with an installation of art work at the
Exhibition Research Lab, Liverpool John Moores University (13-24 March),
constitutes the thesis submission as a whole, such that in the practice of
‘reading’ the thesis, each element remains differentiated from the other
and makes no attempt to ‘represent’ the other. In negating
representation, such practices present a ‘radical’ rethinking of the digital
as a differentiated in-itself, one that is not defined solely by entrenched
computational narratives derived from set theory.
Rather, following Nelson Goodman’s nominalistic rejection of class
constructs, ‘the digital’ is thus understood in onto-epistemic terms as
being syntactically and semantically differentiated (Languages of Art
161). In the context of New Zealand Post-object Art practices of the late
1960s, as read through Jack Burnham’s systems thinking, such a digitally
differentiated ontology is conceived of in terms of the how of practice,
rather than what of objects (“Systems Aesthetics”). After Heidegger, such
a practice is seen as an event of becoming realised by the method of
formal indication, such that what is concealed is brought forth as a
thing-in-itself (The Event; Phenomenological Interpretations 26).
As articulated through the researcher’s own sculptural practice – itself
indebted to Post-object Art – indication is developed as an
intersubjective method applicable to both artists and audience.
However, the constraints imposed on the thing-in-itself by the Husserlian
phenomenological tradition are also taken as imposing correlational
limitations on the ‘digital’, such that it is inherently an in-itself for-us and
thus not differentiated in-itself. To resolve such Kantian dialectics, the
thesis draws on metaphysical arguments put forward by contemporary
speculative ontologies – in particular the work of Quentin Meillassoux
and Tristan Garcia (After Finitude; Form and Object). Where these
contemporary continental philosophies provide a means of releasing
events from the contingency of human ‘reason’, the thesis argues for a
practice of ‘un-reason’ in which indication is recognized as being
contingent on speculation. Practice, it is argued, was never reason’s
alone to determine. Instead, through the ‘radical’ method of speculative
indication, practice is asserted as the event through which the
differentiated digital is revealed as a thing-in-itself of itself and not for us.